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Abstract
Although a decline of trust in the news media can be observed in many countries, in international compari-
son, Switzerland is still considered one of the countries with a relatively high level of media trust. Neverthe-
less, knowledge concerning the factors that promote and hinder media trust in Switzerland is still limited. 
Building on the research on media trust and media scepticism, this study investigates the effects of political 
orientation, political disenchantment, populist attitudes, and news exposure on media trust. The study uses 
survey data (N = 1 019, 50% females, 50% males) on the Internet-using population of the German-speaking 
part of Switzerland, collected in June 2017. Examining media trust by assessing the characteristics of media 
coverage, two dimensions of trust were revealed: (1) trust in journalistic quality and (2) trust in the indepen-
dence and impartiality of media coverage about political issues. Overall, the results demonstrate that the 
level of trust concerning these two dimensions is rather low, whereas the level of trust in journalistic quality 
is slightly higher than trust in the independence and impartiality of media coverage on political issues. Re-
garding possible explanations, the findings show that political disenchantment and populist attitudes, anti- 
establishment attitudes, and demand for people’s sovereignty are negatively related to media trust, while 
belief in the homogeneity of the people is positively related. Moreover, the results reveal that exposure to 
news via public television in Switzerland is positively associated with trust in journalistic quality, while the 
use of special news websites is negatively associated with both dimensions of trust. The implications for 
future research on media trust are discussed.
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1 Introduction
In many Western democracies, there is an 
ongoing public debate about the dramatic 
loss of public trust in the news media and 
journalism. Journalists are suspected of in-
formation concealment, news manipula-
tion, or the production of “fake news.” The 
mainstream media is even condemned as 
“propaganda machines” or “lying press.” 
According to the latest 2017  Reuters In-
stitute Digital News Report, more than 
half of the population (57%) across all 
the 36 countries does not trust the me-
dia (Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, 
Levy, & Kleis Nielsen, 2017, p. 30). Also, in 
Switzerland, where the Swiss Radio and 
Television and printed newspapers are still 
the most important source for news, trust 
in the news media has slightly declined 
from 50% in 2016 to 46% in 2017 (Schranz, 
Eisenegger, & Udris, 2017). Hence,  given 
that more than half the population in 
Switzer land’s direct democracy does not 
trust the media, this erosion of trust is 
highly problematic, especially since most 
people in modern societies rely heavily on 
the news media to understand the major 
political and social issues of their coun-
tries, to observe other social systems such 
as politics, economy or science, and to 
reduce complexity (Kohring, 2004; Luh-
mann, 2001). Therefore, a certain level of 
trust in the news media is a crucial precon-
dition for the functioning of modern dem-
ocratic societies in terms of an informed 
participation in civic life and a building of 
trust in the institutions and activities that 
comprise the social and political spheres 
(Ardèvol-Abreu & Gil de Zúñiga, 2017; 
Kohring, 2004). Hence, it is not surprising 
that communication science is current-
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ly intensifying its research on trust and 
distrust in the news media. In particular, 
media trust in the course of digitization 
has become a new issue (Blöbaum, 2016; 
Grosser, 2016) as recipients often place 
their trust in various new journalistic and 
non-journalistic actors online, of which 
some are accused of intentionally trying 
to undermine the recipients’ trust in the 
traditional news media by disseminating 
misinformation and conspiracy theories 
online. However, despite the relevance of 
the issue, research on media trust is rath-
er fragmented, unsystematic, and, used to 
be strongly focused on the United States; 
yet, nowadays also more studies from Is-
rael and Germany exist. However, given 
the peculiarities of the American media 
system (Hanitzsch, Van Dalen, & Steindl, 
2018), it is difficult to draw conclusions on 
media trust in European countries based 
on U.S. studies, which is particularly true 
for Switzerland. Consequently, very little is 
known so far about trust versus mistrust in 
the news media in Switzerland (Schranz, 
Schneider, & Eisenegger, 2016). Therefore, 
this study aims to investigate the level and 
dimensions of citizens’ media trust in Ger-
man-speaking Switzerland and to explore 
the factors shaping it. The remainder of 
this paper proceeds as follows: first, ex-
isting theoretical concepts of media trust 
are discussed as they will serve as the basis 
for the later operationalisation; second, 
previous studies regarding the factors in-
fluencing media trust and scepticism are 
reviewed to derive the paper’s guiding 
hypotheses and research questions; third, 
data and measurements are introduced; 
and finally, the results are presented and 
critically discussed in the conclusion. 
2 Defining and Measuring Trust in 
News Media 
Although conceptualisations of trust can 
be found across a broad range of disci-
plines, including psychology (Rotter, 1967), 
organisation studies (Bachmann & Zaheer, 
2006; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995), 
sociology (Luhmann, 1968; Misztal, 1996), 
and media and communication sciences 
(Bentele, 1994; Blöbaum, 2016; Kohring, 
2004), there is still no commonly shared 
concept. However, despite the varied defi-
nitions, a number of key features of trust 
can be extracted from the existing research 
on trust (Blöbaum, 2016).1 While from a 
psychological perspective, trust describes 
“a mental state, an attitude” of individu-
als (Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2000, p. 801), 
from a sociological perspective, trust re-
fers to the relation between a trusting par-
ty, the trustor, and a party to be trusted, 
the trustee (Blöbaum, 2016), in which the 
trusting party is willing “to be vulnerable 
to the actions” of the trustee (Mayer, Da-
vis, Schoorman, 1995, p. 712). Thus, in 
terms of media trust, it is not the interper-
sonal trust between individuals, but rather 
the system trust (Luhmann, 1968) or pub-
lic trust (Bentele, 1994) that is relevant. Ac-
cording to Bentele (2015, p. 622), “Public 
trust can be defined as a process and an 
outcome of a publicly generated, commu-
nicative mechanism within which public-
ly perceptible individuals, organizations, 
and other social systems at as ‘trust ob-
jects’. Public trust is generated within the 
public communication process in which 
‘trust subjects’ attribute more or less trust 
to trust objects” (see also Bentele, 1994). 
In general, the trust relation is asymmet-
ric as the trustee usually has a resource, 
for example, certain information, that the 
trustor does not have in the same amount 
(Jackob, 2012; Tsfati, 2002). Consequently, 
putting trust in the actions of the trustee 
enables the trusting party to reduce infor-
mation complexity (Bentele, 1994; Luh-
mann, 1968) and to act in a situation of 
unlimited information and uncertainty 
(Blöbaum, 2016). In the context of media 
and communication, trust refers to the re-
lations between journalists, media organ-
1 One reason why research on media trust 
is rather heterogeneous is that communi-
cation research on media trust initially 
emerged under the label of media credibility 
(Kohring & Matthes, 2007). Consequently, 
the terms “media trust” and “media credibil-
ity” do not refer to totally different concepts, 
but have been used partly synonymously in 
previous research (e. g., Gaziano & McGrath, 
1986; Kiousis, 2001).
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isations, or journalism as a social system, 
which are the trust objects, and the recipi-
ents, who are the trust subjects (Blöbaum, 
2016; Kohring, 2004). Therefore, media 
trust can be defined as recipients’ willing-
ness “to be vulnerable to the journalistic 
system’s selection and communication of 
current information” (Grosser, 2016, p. 5) 
or “to be vulnerable to news content based 
on the expectation that the media will per-
form in a satisfactory manner” (Hanitzsch 
et al., 2018, p. 5). Thus, recipients put their 
trust in journalists, whom they expect “to 
put aside their political views and create 
unbiased news stories in accordance with 
the principles of ‘objectivity,’ ‘fairness,’ 
and ‘clear separation of information and 
opinion’” (Ardèvol-Abreu & Gil de  Zúñiga, 
2017, p. 704) and in journalistic selectivi-
ty as “journalists selectively choose some 
information over other information” 
(Kohring &  Matthes, 2007, p. 239). Me-
dia distrust (Ladd, 2010) or media scep-
ticism (Tsfati, 2002, 2003, 2010; Tsfati & 
Peri, 2006), however, refer to the opposite 
concept as recipients have the impression 
“that journalists are not fair or objective 
in their reports”  (Tsfati, 2003, p. 159) and 
that their selection decisions are inappro-
priate. Finally, with respect to the journal-
istic principles of fairness and balance, 
the concept of media (dis-)trust is closely 
related to the hostile media phenomenon, 
which describes peoples’ tendency to per-
ceive media coverage as biased against 
their own views (Gunther, 1992; Vallone, 
Ross, & Lepper, 1985).
Given the variety of definitions and 
concepts, it is not surprising that trust in 
the media is operationalised in very dif-
ferent ways. One approach is to measure a 
diffuse, general level of media trust by ask-
ing recipients how much they trust the me-
dia or news (e. g., Ardèvol-Abreu & Gil de 
Zúñiga, 2017; Fletcher & Park, 2017; Jones, 
2004; Lee, 2010; Tsfati & Ariely, 2014). The 
problem with this approach, however, is 
that recipients have very different under-
standings of trust, which are not taken 
into account (Kohring, 2004). A second 
approach is to measure media trust with 
multiple items. For example, Kohring and 
Matthes (2007) measure people’s trust in 
journalism with numerous items on four 
dimensions: trust in the selectivity of is-
sues, trust in the selectivity of facts, trust in 
the accuracy of depictions, and trust in the 
journalistic assessment (see also Kohring, 
2004). Likewise, Tsfati (2002, 2003), who 
examines media trust under the label “me-
dia scepticism,” uses several items he ini-
tially adapted from Gaziano and McGrath’s 
(1986) News Credibility Scale and Cappella 
and Jamieson’s (1997) concept of “media 
cynicism.” Moreover, single trust indica-
tors such as impartiality or balance are at 
the core of hostile media research (Gun-
ther, 1992; Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985).
3 Predictors of Trust and Distrust  
in the Media
The following section summarises the 
state of research on how recipients’ char-
acteristics are related to trust and distrust 
in the media. In order to systematise the 
sometimes very fragmented and contra-
dictory state of research (Tsfati & Cohen, 
2013, p. 4), three dimensions of influence 
can be distinguished: political character-
istics, media-related attitudes, individual 
behaviours, and individual characteristics.
3.1 Political Characteristics
From previous research, a whole series of 
connections between political character-
istics and media trust can be derived. First, 
several studies found that a more conser-
vative (Gronke & Cook, 2007; Jones, 2004; 
Ladd, 2010) and right-wing political orien-
tation (Livio & Cohen, 2016; for example, 
for the German political party Alternative 
für Deutschland [AfD], Schultz, Jackob, 
Ziegele, Quiring, & Schemer, 2017; Schin-
dler et al., 2018), are associated with lower 
levels of media trust. Likewise, studies on 
the hostile media phenomenon found that 
perceptions of media bias are more strong-
ly pronounced among conservatives than 
among democrats (e. g., Dalton, Beck, & 
Huckfeldt, 1998; Huge & Glynn, 2010; Lee, 
2005). Hence, negative attitudes toward 
the news media result from recipients per-
ceiving the media as being biased against 
their political predispositions. Second, 
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scholars provide evidence that trust in the 
institutional news media is negatively re-
lated to political disenchantment (Schultz 
et al., 2017) and political cynicism (Carr, 
Barnidge, Lee, & Tsang, 2014). In turn, sat-
isfaction with the US president’s job per-
formance (Bennett, Rhine, Flickinger, & 
Bennett, 1999) and trust in politics (Jones, 
2004; Lee, 2010) are positively related to 
media trust. Likewise, media cynics – peo-
ple that deeply distrust the established 
mainstream media – are strongly disap-
pointed with politics and have doubts in 
the democratic system (Jackob, Schultz, 
Ziegele, Schemer, & Quiring, 2017). Third, 
initial findings on the relation between 
populist attitudes and media trust demon-
strate that people holding stronger pop-
ulist attitudes show lower levels of media 
trust (Fawzi, 2016) and higher levels of 
media hostility (Schindler et al., 2018). 
This relation seems particularly plausible 
as “several researchers have suggested that 
populist actors often perceive mainstream 
media as part of the elite, as supporters of 
the established political powers, and thus 
advocates of the status quo” (Reinemann, 
Matthes, & Sheafer, 2017, p. 389). Conse-
quently, populists are quite likely to blame 
the mainstream media and journalists for 
what they perceive as unfair media cov-
erage. Based on these findings, it can be 
summarised that right-wing political ori-
entation, political disenchantment, and 
populist attitudes seem to diminish trust 
in the media, while trust in politics have 
an obverse effect. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis can be predicted:
H1: Right-wing political orientation 
(H1a), political disenchantment (H1b), 
and populist attitudes (H1c) are nega-
tively associated with media trust.
3.2 News Exposure
Presumably, it is no coincidence that the 
present debate concerning a decline of 
trust in the mainstream media corre-
sponds with the digital media revolution. 
Media usage has become increasingly 
individualised, and many new informa-
tion opportunities, such as social media, 
blogs, or alternative news websites, have 
emerged. At the same time, competition 
for the audience’s attention is increasing, 
and the growing economic pressure on 
the established media has led to a loss of 
quality in many places. Consequently, the 
presumption suggests that media trust 
and distrust are related to people’s individ-
ual information behaviours and media us-
age patterns. Although previous research 
supports this presumption, the direction 
of the relation, however, seems to vary 
strongly among different sources of infor-
mation. Various studies reveal a positive 
relation between traditional news media 
use and media trust (Jackob, 2012; Schranz 
et al., 2016; Schultz et al., 2017; Tsfati, 2010; 
Tsfati & Ariely, 2014). For example, Tsfati 
and Ariely (2014) found a positive relation 
between media trust and the use of televi-
sion news and newspapers. Schranz et al. 
(2016) and Schultz et al. (2017) confirmed 
such a relation in particular for the use of 
public television, which in both Switzer-
land and Germany functions as a public 
institution. With respect to online media, 
empirical evidence is rather mixed. In the 
U.S. context, Johnson and Kaye (2014) 
found that using blogs and YouTube for 
information purposes was related nega-
tively to trust in traditional news media, 
while using social networking sites (SNSs) 
for information purposes was related pos-
itively. By contrast, according to the find-
ings of Schranz et al. (2016), social media 
use was associated negatively with media 
trust. Finally, the use of non-mainstream, 
alternative news websites seems to be pos-
itively related with media distrust (Schultz 
et al., 2017; Tsfati, 2010; Tsfati & Peri, 2006). 
Based on these findings, the following two 
hypotheses regarding the relation between 
media use and media trust are predicted:
H2. Greater exposure to news through 
mainstream news media will be posi-
tively related to media trust. 
H3. Greater exposure to news through 
social media (H3a) and non-main-
stream, alternative media (H3b) will be 
negatively related to media trust. 
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3.3 Sociodemographic Characteristics
Regarding the relation between socio-
demographic characteristics and media 
(dis-)trust, the empirical evidence is rath-
er diverse. For example, two international 
comparative studies found that men trust 
the media significantly less than women 
(Schranz et al., 2016; Schultz et al., 2017; 
Tsfati & Ariely, 2014). By contrast, vari-
ous single-country studies found no re-
lation between sex and media (dis-)trust 
(e. g., Bennett, Rhine, & Flickinger, 2001; 
 Gronke & Cook, 2007; Lee, 2010; Livio & 
Cohen, 2016). Findings on the effects of 
education and age are similarly contradic-
tory. While some studies found that edu-
cation was a negative predictor of media 
trust (Gronke & Cook, 2007;  Tsfati & Ariely, 
2014), others found a positive (Donsbach, 
Rentsch, Schielicke, & Degen, 2009; John-
son & Kaye, 2014) or even no effect ( Jackob, 
2012; Lee, 2010) of education. Similarly, 
most studies found that age had no effect 
(Bennett et al., 1999; Jackob, 2012; Lee, 
2010; Livio & Cohen, 2016; Tsfati & Ariely, 
2014). Thus, as previous studies have pro-
duced inconsistent findings on the effects 
of sociodemographic factors, the following 
research question is stated:
RQ1: How are sex, education, and age 
 related to media trust? 
4 Methods
4.1 Data Collection and Sample
A standardised online survey was con-
ducted in June 2017 within the population 
of the German-speaking part of Switzer-
land among individuals older than 16. Re-
spondents were recruited via an online ac-
cess panel of a professional external panel 
provider, which is certified according to 
Global ISO 26362 and a member of the 
European Society for Opinion and Market 
Research (ESOMAR) and the German So-
ciety for Online Research (DGOF). Specific 
quotas regarding age, sex (crossed), and 
educational levels were imposed. Thus, 
the sample is roughly representative of 
the Internet-using population of the Ger-
man-speaking part of Switzerland. Overall, 
1 019 people (50% females, 50% males) be-
tween 16 and 74 years old (M = 44 years of 
age) took part in the study. Approximately 
11% reported a low level of education, 49% 
a middle level, and 40% a high level. 
4.2 Measures
Media trust. Considering the problems 
of measuring people’s media trust with 
a single item (see Kohring, 2004), this 
study examines media trust with a total of 
11 items adapted from previous studies on 
trust in journalism (e. g., Kohring & Mat-
thes, 2007), media credibility ( Gaziano & 
McGrath, 1986; Meyer, 1988), and media 
scepticism (Tsfati, 2002, 2003) on a five-
point Likert scale (1 [“strongly disagree”] 
to 5 [“strongly agree”]), which were sub-
sequently subjected to factor analysis. 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin (KMO) statistic 
was 0.91, indicating a strong validity for 
the factor analysis. The solution resulted 
in two distinct factors accounting for 63% 
of the total cumulative explained variance 
(Table 1). The first factor comprises seven 
items that examine to what extent recipi-
ents have the impression that the media 
meet journalistic quality criteria, such as 
credibility, balance, correctness or com-
pleteness; therefore, this factor was la-
belled trust in journalistic quality of media 
coverage about political issues. For further 
analysis, the items were summarised in an 
index (M = 2.8, SD = 0.8; Cronbach’s α = .91), 
where the higher mean scores reflect a 
higher level of media trust. The second fac-
tor includes four items that reflect recipi-
ents’ perception that the media coverage 
about political issues is influenced, biased, 
and one-sided. Due to the negative formu-
lation of these items, they were recoded for 
further analysis and summarised in an in-
dex trust in independence and impartiali-
ty of media coverage about political issues 
(M = 2.6, SD = 0.8; Cronbach’s α = .73).
Political dispositions. The respon-
dents’ political left-right orientation was 
assessed with one item asking respon-
dents to place their own political posi-
tion on a scale, where 1 meant “left” and 
7 meant “right” (M = 4.1; SD = 1.5). Re-
spondents’ disenchantment with politics 
was examined using indicators that have 
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been applied in previous research on po-
litical disengagement, such as perceived 
political non-influence and dissatisfac-
tion with politics in terms of economic 
situation, government’s performance, 
and democracy (Arzheimer, 2002; Wolling, 
1999). Attitudes towards the possibility of 
having a political influence were exam-
ined using the following two statements 
on a five-point Likert scale (1 [“very little”] 
to 5 [“a lot”]), which were taken from the 
ESS 2014 questionnaire for Switzerland 
(FORS, 2014): “How much would you say 
the political system in Switzerland allows 
people like you to have a say in what the 
government does?” (M = 3.1; SD = 1.1) and 
“How much would you say that the polit-
ical system in Switzerland allows people 
like you to have an influence on politics?” 
(M = 3.0; SD = 1.1). For further analysis, the 
items were recoded and entered in the in-
dex perceived non-influence on politics 
in Switzerland (M = 3.0, SD = 1.0; Cron-
bach’s α = 0.86), where higher mean scores 
indicate that people are less convinced 
that they have an influence on politics in 
Switzerland. Respondents’ dissatisfaction 
with politics was examined using the fol-
lowing three statements on a five-point 
Likert scale (1 [“extremely dissatisfied”] 
to 5 [“extremely satisfied”]), which were 
also taken from the ESS 2014 question-
naire for Switzerland (FORS, 2014): “On 
the whole, how satisfied are you with the 
present state of the economy in Switzer-
land?” (M = 3.5; SD = 1.0), “Now thinking 
about the Switzerland government, how 
satisfied are you with the way it is doing its 
job?” (M = 3.1; SD = 1.0), “And on the whole, 
how satisfied are you with the way de-
mocracy works in Switzerland?” (M = 3.6; 
SD = 1.1). For further analysis, the items 
were recoded and summarised in an in-
dex dissatisfaction with politics (M = 2.6, 
SD = 0.9; Cronbach’s α = 0.82), where high-
er values reflect more positive attitudes 
and, thus, a greater political satisfaction.2 
Finally, populist attitudes were examined 
using the nine-item version of the in-
ventory developed in the National Cen-
tre of Competence in Research (NCCR) 
Democracy project (Schulz et al., 2017; 
Wirth et al., 2016). Based on this invento-
ry, three dimensions of populist attitudes 
were assessed, each with three items on 
a five-point Likert scale (1 [“strongly dis-
agree”] to 5 [“strongly agree”]): anti-es-
tablishment attitude (M = 3.5, SD = 0.9; 
2 To ensure that political disenchantment can 
actually be considered separately from me-
dia trust/distrust or whether both belong 
to the same “anti-establishment” concept 
an additional factor analysis using both the 
indicators for political disenchantment and 
for media trust was calculated (see Table 4 in 
the Appendix). The analysis extracted three 
dimensions, the two dimensions of media 
trust (see also Table 1) and a third one which 
comprised all indicators for political disen-
chantment. Thus, political disenchantment 
formed its own factor and therefore was con-
sidered as a predictor of media trust in this 
study.
Table 1: Trust in the media coverage on political issues (factor analysis)
Media coverage about political issues… Trust in journalistic quality of media 
coverage about political issues
Trust in independence and impartiality 
of  media coverage about political issues 
(recoded)
… is credible. 0.83
… is balanced. 0.82
… is carefully researched. 0.82
… presents the facts as they are. 0.81
… takes all essential aspects into account. 0.80
… is neutral. 0.76
… takes place from different angles. 0.75
… is strongly influenced by politics and economy. 0.82
… is determined by the political elite. 0.82
… is distorted. 0.69
… focuses only on negative aspects. 0.61
Eigenvalue 4.86 2.03
Note. Primary component analysis with varimax rotation; 62% explained variance; all factor loadings > 0.40; KMO = 0.91.
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Cronbach’s α = .66), demand for sover-
eignty of the people (M = 3.9, SD = 0.9; 
Cronbach’s α = .82), and belief in the ho-
mogeneity of the people (M = 2.9, SD = 1.0; 
Cronbach’s α = .71).3
News exposure. To examine people’s 
exposure to news through mainstream 
media, social media, and non-main-
stream, alternative media, respondents 
were asked to indicate how often they use 
different information sources to inform 
themselves about political issues on an 
8-point scale (0 [“never”] to 7 [“several 
times a day”]).4 Exposure to news through 
mainstream media was examined for the 
following five media outlets, and it did 
not matter whether respondents used 
them offline (on TV or as a printed ver-
sion) or online (media library, website or 
via an app): public television news (M = 3.0; 
SD = 1.9), private television news (M = 2.3; 
SD = 2.0), tabloids and commuter news-
papers (M = 2.9; SD = 2.2), local and na-
tional daily newspapers (M = 2.9; SD = 1.9), 
and weekly newspapers and magazines 
3 Anti-establishment attitude: “MPs in Parlia-
ment very quickly lose touch with ordinary 
people” (M = 3.7; SD = 1.1); “The differenc-
es between ordinary people and the ruling 
elite are much greater than the differences 
between ordinary people” (M = 3.8; SD = 1.1); 
“People like me have no influence on what 
the government does” (M = 3.2; SD = 1.2); 
demand for sovereignty of the people: “The 
people should have the final say on the most 
important political issues by voting on them 
directly in referendums” (M = 4.0; SD = 1.1); 
“The people should be asked whenever 
important decisions are taken” (M = 4.0; 
SD = 1.0); “The people, not the politicians, 
should make our most important policy de-
cisions” (M = 3.7; SD = 1.1); belief in the ho-
mogeneity of the people: “Ordinary people 
are of good and honest character” (M = 3.1; 
SD = 1.2); “Ordinary people all pull togeth-
er” (M = 2.7; SD = 1.2); “Although the Swiss 
are very different from each other, when it 
comes down to it they all think the same” 
(M = 2.8; SD = 1.2).
4 Scale is based on the latest Reuters Insti-
tute Digital News Report 2017; 0 (“never”), 
1 (“less than once a month”), 2 (“less than 
once a week”), 3 (“once a week”), 4 (“two to 
three days per week”), 5 (“four to six days per 
week”), 6 (“every day”), 7 (“several times a 
day”).
(M = 2.1; SD = 1.7). Using political informa-
tion through social media was measured 
for Facebook (M = 2.2; SD = 2.5), Twitter 
(M = 0.7; SD = 1.6), and YouTube (M = 1.7; 
SD = 2.1). Finally, blogs (M = 0.7; SD = 1.3) 
and special news websites, which are only 
available online (M = 0.9; SD = 1.7) served 
as indicators for using political informa-
tion from non-mainstream, alternative 
media. 
5 Results
Taking a closer look at the descriptive re-
sults, it becomes apparent that just a mar-
ginal group of respondents perceives that 
the media coverage about political issues 
is independent and not influenced by poli-
tics and economy (9% agreement), the po-
litical elite (15% agreement), or distorted 
(24% agreement). Likewise, only a minori-
ty has the impression that the media cov-
erage is neutral (16% agreement), presents 
the facts as they are (20% agreement), and 
is balanced (22% agreement). Overall, the 
findings reveal that the level of media trust 
in the journalistic quality (M = 2.8, SD = 0.8) 
of media coverage is slightly higher among 
the Swiss population than is their trust in 
the independence and impartiality of me-
dia coverage about political issues (M = 2.6, 
SD = 0.8) (see Table 2).
To explore further how media trust re-
lates to sociodemographic characteristics, 
political dispositions, and news exposure, 
two hierarchical regression analyses were 
calculated using the two earlier extracted 
dimensions of media trust (see Table 1) as 
dependent variables. In the first step of the 
regressions, the control variables (age, sex, 
and education) were considered. In the 
second step, the various indicators for po-
litical dispositions were added as predic-
tors. Finally, in the third step, variables on 
news exposure were included in the anal-
ysis. The results are presented in Table 3.
The results of the first step of the regres-
sions show that, with one exception, media 
trust is not related to sociodemographic 
characteristics (see Table 3). Only young-
er people reported a higher level of trust 
in the independence and impartiality of 
238 Arlt / Studies in Communication Sciences 18.2 (2018), pp. 231–246
media coverage about political issues (age: 
β = –0.11; p < .001). By contrast, the findings 
of the second step of the regressions reveal 
that media trust is strongly related to peo-
ple’s political dispositions. This becomes 
particularly apparent through the strong 
change of R-squared in both models. How-
ever, the effects of the single variables were 
extremely dissimilar. First, people’s politi-
cal orientation was not related to media 
trust; therefore, H1a must be rejected. 
Regarding the supposed negative relation 
between media trust and political disen-
chantment, this relation was strongly sup-
ported for people’s trust in the journalistic 
quality, but not for trust in the indepen-
dence and impartiality of media coverage 
about political issues. People perceiving 
themselves as having a low influence on 
politics (β = –0.23; p < 0.001) reported a 
lower level of trust in the journalistic quali-
ty of media coverage about political issues. 
Moreover, people who are more strongly 
dissatisfied with politics showed lower 
levels of trust in both journalistic quality 
and the independence and impartiality 
of media coverage (see  Table 3). Looking 
at these findings together, H1b is strongly 
supported as people who are disenchant-
ed with politics show lower levels of me-
dia trust. With respect to the presumed 
negative influence of populist attitudes, 
the findings are mixed. For example, peo-
ple’s anti-establishment attitudes were the 
strongest predictor of trust in the indepen-
dence and impartiality of media coverage 
about political issues (β = –0.41; p < 0.001), 
but showed no effect on trust in journalis-
tic quality. Moreover, a strong demand for 
people’s sovereignty was a negative predic-
tor of media trust in both cases; however, 
it was significantly lower (β = –0.10; p < .01). 
By contrast, the third dimension of popu-
list attitudes tested here, the belief in the 
homogeneity of the people, was positively 
related to trust in the journalistic quality 
of media coverage about political issues 
(β = 0.16; p < .001). Thus, H1c was partly 
supported for anti-establishment attitude 
and the demand for people’s sovereignty 
but must be rejected for the belief in the 
homogeneity of the people. 
Regarding the relation between news 
exposure and media trust, the results of 
the third step of the regressions revealed 
a rather weak relation, as the R-squared 
changed just slightly, and the variables 
showed only isolated effects (see Table 3). 
Of the various variables tested for expo-
sure to news through mainstream media, 
only one significant effect was found: 
People that are more frequently exposed 
to news via public television (β = 0.18; 
p < .001) reported a higher level of trust in 
the journalistic quality of media coverage 
about political issues. Consequently, H2 
was confirmed only for one case. With re-
spect to the presumed negative relation 
between exposure to news through social 
media and media trust, H3a must be re-
Table 2: Descriptive results on distrust in the media coverage on political issues 
The media coverage on political issues… M (SD)1 Disagreement2 Agreement3
… is neutral. 2.5 (1.0) 48% 16%
… presents the facts as they are. 2.8 (1.0) 42% 20%
… is balanced. 3.1 (1.0) 36% 22%
… takes all essential aspects into account. 2.9 (1.0) 36% 25%
… is carefully researched. 2.7 (1.0) 32% 27%
… is credible. 2.9 (1.0) 32% 29%
… takes place from different angles. 2.8 (1.0) 27% 31%
Index: trust in journalistic quality of media coverage about political issues 2.8 (0.8)
… is strongly influenced by politics and economy. (recoded) 2.2 (0.9) 64% 9%
… is determined by the political elite. (recoded) 2.9 (1.1) 57% 15%
… is distorted. (recoded) 2.8 (1.0) 40% 24%
… mainly focuses only negative aspects. (recoded) 2.4 (1.1) 36% 28%
Index: trust in independence and impartiality of media coverage about political issues 2.6 (0.8)
Note. 1Mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) on five-point Likert scale (1 [“strongly disagree”] to 5 [“strongly agree”]); 2points 1 and 2 on the 
scale. 3points 4 and 5 on the scale. 
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jected as no such effect could be found for 
Facebook, Twitter, or YouTube. Regarding 
the effect of using non-mainstream, alter-
native media on media trust, the evidence 
is mixed. The results showed that using a 
blog is positively related to people’s trust 
in the journalistic quality of media cover-
age about political issues (β = 0.19; p < .01). 
Thus, in the case of blogs, H3b must be re-
jected. By contrast, the findings revealed 
a strong relation between the exposure to 
news through special news websites on 
the Internet that provide alternative in-
formation, and trust in the media: people 
Table 3: Hierarchical regression: influences of sociodemographic factors, political  dispositions, 
and news exposure on media trust
Trust in journalistic quality of media 
coverage about political issues
Trust in independence and impartiality 
of media coverage about political 
issues
β Sig. β Sig.
Block 1: Control Variables 
Age (in years) 0.05 –0.11 **
Sex (men) 0.03 0.02
Education (high) 0.02 –0.02
R² 0.00 0.01
Block 2: Control Variables + Political Predispositions
Age (in years) 0.10 ** 0.00
Sex (men) –0.01 0.03
Education (high) –0.03 –0.09 **
Political orientation (1 = left; 7 = right) –0.06 0.01
Perceived non-influence on politics (high) –0.23 *** 0.03
Dissatisfaction with politics (high) –0.29 *** –0.07 *
Anti-establishment attitude (strong) 0.01 –0.41 ***
Demand for people’s sovereignty (strong) –0.10 ** –0.10 **
Belief in homogeneity of the people (strong) 0.16 *** 0.02
R² change 0.23 0.20
Block 3: Control Variables + Political Predispositions +  
News Exposure
Age (in years) 0.02 –0.02
Sex (men) –0.01 0.03
Education (high) –0.05 –0.09 **
Political orientation (1= left; 7 = right) –0.07 * 0.00
Perceived non-influence on politics (high) –0.20 *** 0.02
Dissatisfaction with politics (high) –0.26 *** –0.06
Anti-establishment attitude (strong) –0.01 –0.40 ***
Demand for people’s sovereignty (strong) –0.09 * –0.09 *
Belief in homogeneity of the people (strong) 0.15 *** 0.02
Public television news use 0.18 *** 0.02
Private television news use –0.01 0.07
Tabloid and “commuter” newspapers use 0.05 –0.01
Local and national daily newspapers use 0.00 0.02
Weekly newspapers and magazines use 0.01 –0.06
Facebook use –0.06 –0.05
Twitter use 0.01 –0.02
YouTube use –0.01 0.00
Blog use 0.10 ** 0.03
Special News websites use –0.09 * –0.10 **
R² change 0.04 0.02
Total R² 0.27 0.23
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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more frequently using such news websites 
to perceive information on political issues 
show lower levels of trust both in the qual-
ity (β = –0.09; p < 0.05) and in the indepen-
dence and impartiality of media coverage 
about political issues (β = –0.10; p < .01). 
Therefore, in the case of news exposure 
through special news websites, H3b was 
confirmed.
6 Conclusion
Although media trust in Switzerland is 
high compared to other countries, citi-
zens’ mistrust has risen by four percentage 
points in the last year (fög, 2017). How-
ever, with respect to the predicators and 
consequences of negative and sceptical 
attitudes towards the mainstream media, 
the majority of research now stems from 
the United States, Israel and Germany. 
Thus, despite the potential dangers of a 
declining media trust for the Swiss de-
mocracy, particularly as public broadcasts 
and the press are still the most important 
sources for news and political information 
for Swiss citizens, little is known about the 
dimensions, level, and predictors of media 
trust in Switzerland. Therefore, the present 
study explores media trust among Switzer-
land’s German-speaking population. 
Even though communication science 
has been dealing with media (dis-)trust 
and related phenomena like the hostile 
media phenomenon quite intensively for 
some years, no commonly shared concept 
of media trust exists. However, common 
to most conceptualisations is that media 
trust refers to the relation between the 
media and its audience, where the audi-
ence, as the trusting party, is willing to be 
vulnerable to news coverage and put their 
trust in an accurate, comprehensive, and 
neutral selection and presentation of in-
formation by the media and journalists 
(e. g., Ardèvol-Abreu & Gil de Zúñiga, 2017; 
Grosser, 2016; Kohring & Matthes, 2007). 
Based on this, many studies have examined 
trust in the media through an assessment 
of the characteristics and quality of media 
coverage that is the result of journalistic 
decision making and actions (Kohring, 
2004; Kohring & Matthes, 2007; Tsfati, 
2002, 2003). Accordingly, in this study, 
media trust has been measured with mul-
tiple items to assess the characteristics of 
reporting on political issues (see  Table 1). 
Thereby, two dimensions of media trust 
were extracted: (1) trust in the journalistic 
quality and (2) trust in the independence 
and impartiality of media coverage on po-
litical issues. Yet, with respect to the level 
of media trust, the findings show that it 
was rather low among the Swiss popula-
tion on both dimensions. Regarding the 
question of who trusts the media, hypoth-
eses regarding the relations of political 
characteristics and news exposure have 
been derived from previous research. To 
test these hypotheses, hierarchical regres-
sion analyses were applied to data from a 
quantitative online survey conducted in 
June 2017 with a quota sample of 1 019 cit-
izens from the German-speaking part of 
Switzerland. 
Looking at the effects of people’s po-
litical characteristics, the results strongly 
supported previous research that there is 
a significant relationship between political 
disenchantment and media trust; and yet, 
that they can be belong to different con-
cepts (see also Table 4 in the Appendix). 
Perceptions of a minor influence on poli-
tics in Switzerland and dissatisfaction with 
politics are strongly related to lower levels 
of media trust. Furthermore, the findings 
strengthen the initial evidence that media 
trust is related to populist attitudes ( Fawzi, 
2016; Schindler et al., 2018); however, the 
direction and strength of this relation 
seem to vary along with the conceptuali-
sation of populist attitudes. In this study, 
populist attitudes have been measured 
as three-dimensional (Schulz et al., 2017; 
Wirth et al., 2016), producing evidence on 
the relation of these three dimensions with 
media trust. While an anti-elitism attitude 
and preference for people’s sovereign-
ty were related negatively to media trust, 
belief in people’s homogeneity was posi-
tively related. Thus, the findings in partic-
ular support the argumentation of Aalberg 
et al. (2017) that populists perceive insti-
tutional media as part of the political elite 
as an anti-elitism attitude turned out to be 
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the strongest predictor for a low level of 
trust in the independence and impartiality 
of media coverage of political issues. Thus, 
people who view political elites as strong-
ly distant from ordinary people and who 
view ordinary people as hardly influential 
on politicians show lower levels of trust in 
the independence and impartiality of me-
dia coverage of political issues. 
The positive relation between main-
stream media use and media trust that was 
found in previous studies (Schranz et al., 
2016; Tsfati, 2010; Tsfati & Ariely, 2014; 
Tsfati & Cappella, 2003; Tsfati & Cappella, 
2005) was only supported for one case: 
People who more frequently use public 
television news report higher levels of trust 
in the journalistic quality of media cover-
age on political issues. Thus, this finding in 
particular supports the essential role of a 
distinct public broadcast – as is the case in 
Switzerland – in the debate regarding trust 
and mistrust in media. Other than expect-
ed, the use of social media for information 
reasons was not related to media trust. Fi-
nally, this study’s findings strengthen the 
previous research that has shown that me-
dia trust is negatively related to the use of 
non-mainstream, alternative media (e. g., 
Tsfati, 2010; Tsfati & Peri, 2006). In the 
present study, there is a consistent finding 
that a more frequent use of special news 
websites that provide alternative informa-
tion on political issues is negatively related 
to trust both in the journalistic quality and 
in the independence and impartiality of 
media coverage about political issues. This 
result also strengthens the type of selective 
exposure that focusses on the medium as 
in the contemporary media environment 
people have the opportunity “to go on-
line for information when they disagree 
with or do not trust the reportage in more 
mainstream outlets” (Stroud, 2017, p. 5). 
Overall, the results have revealed that 
media trust is mostly affected by political 
and populist attitudes and less affected by 
sociodemographic factors and media use. 
This finding underlines the general obser-
vation that the mistrust of the population 
is not directed specifically against the me-
dia, but more generally against social and 
political institutions and elites.
This study has some methodological 
weaknesses that must be acknowledged 
and addressed in future research. The first 
limitation relates to the use of cross-sec-
tional data to examine the relation be-
tween political disenchantment, media 
use, and media trust; there are several rea-
sons to expect that these three phenome-
na influence each other. This paper treated 
political disenchantment and news expo-
sure as predictors of media trust; however, 
other studies examine media scepticism as 
a predictor of exposure (Tsfati &  Cappella, 
2003, 2005) and political trust ( Ariely, 
2015) or media exposure as a predictor of 
political disenchantment (Maurer, 2003; 
Wolling, 1999, 2014). Consequently, so far, 
the question of the direction of causality 
between media trust, political disenchant-
ment, and media use, and how they may 
affect each other over time, remains open. 
Therefore, in future research, panel sur-
veys should be conducted to examine how 
these three concepts change over time. 
Particularly, the question of whether a neg-
ative downward spiral between a decline 
in media trust, political disenchantment, 
and news avoidance behaviours can be 
observed, and which factors may have the 
potential to counteract such a spiral, is of 
strong scientific and political interest. Sec-
ond, this study uses data from an online 
survey conducted within the population of 
the German-speaking part of Switzerland; 
thus, the findings provide only partial in-
sights. Therefore, future studies should 
examine the existence of media trust from 
a comparative perspective between the 
German-speaking, the French-speaking, 
and the Italian-speaking parts of Switzer-
land. Such an approach would provide an 
essential contribution for two reasons: 1) it 
allows for exploring the interplay between 
the media trust and political disenchant-
ment in the different language regions, as 
well as the subsequent consequences for 
the direct democracy in Switzerland as a 
whole; 2) it offers the possibility not only 
to consider the influencing factors on me-
dia disenchantment at the individual level 
but also on the context level, as all three 
language regions represent linguistically 
segmented media markets that also dif-
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fer in the quality of the political reporting 
(fög, 2015, 2016).
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Appendix
Table 4: Trust in the media coverage on political issues and political disenchantment  
(factor analysis)
Trust in journalistic 
quality of media 
coverage about
political issues
Indicators 
for political disen-
chantment
Trust in indepen-
dence and impartial-
ity of media cover-
age about political 
issues (recoded)
Media coverage about political issues…
… is carefully researched. 0.80
… is balanced. 0.80
… is credible. 0.79
… presents the facts as they are. 0.78
… takes all essential aspects into account. 0.77
… takes place from different angles. 0.75
… is neutral. 0.75
On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works 
in Switzerland?’
0.78
How much would you say the political system in Switzerland allows 
people like you to have a say in what the government does?
0.76
How much would you say that the political system in  Switzerland 
allows people like you to have an influence on politics?
0.74
Now thinking about the Switzerland government, how satisfied are 
you with the way it is doing its job?
0.74
And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the present state of 
the economy in Switzerland?
0.70
Media coverage about political issues…
… is strongly influenced by politics and economy. 0.82
… is determined by the political elite. 0.81
… is distorted. 0.68
… focuses only negative aspects. 0.62
Eigenvalue 5.95 2.07 1.94
Note. Primary component analysis with varimax rotation; 62% explained variance; all factor loadings > 0.40; KMO = 0.90.

